Alice Walker and her Life Annotated Bibliography

Alice Walker and her Life - Annotated Bibliography Example The writers life is heralded through a narration of her childhood days and how she grew up. Through this effort, Lazo identifies the links between her parents and family and the old traces of segregation and oppression of Black people which shaped the mindset and personality of Alice Walker. This is narrated skillfully in the first three chapters of the book which are on her early years. Lazo then goes on to describe how her injuries and difficulties as a child shaped her adult life in the era of the civil rights movements and other discourses which gave her the impetus to write and publish her books. This work provides a very authoritative discussion about how Alice Walker was shaped and how she evolved to become who she is now. This will be an important element in the research because it will provide a reference point for the assessment of Alice Walkers personality. The book also discusses some of the social activities that Alice Walker is connected with at the moment. Professor Bloom is a world acclaimed lecturer at Yale. He is a top professor in the Humanities. He has won a lot of prizes for his ability to critique literary works and provide the literary elements of such projects. Her book on Alice Walker provides a complete guide to Alice Walkers literary style. Bloom gives a critical analysis of her major works and identifies the main elements of literature in each of the books. This is done through a series of critical essays that provide in-depth evaluations of each and every important tool that Alice Walker used to convey her plot and characters. This is vital for the research because it provides a convenient point through which references can be made about the literary elements of Alice Walkers works. Also, since it is a compilation of various critiques, it provides a summary of the plot of Alice Walkers major projects. This will give an insight into projects that cannot be read in-depth for some critical

Principle-Agent Model of Employment Relationship

Principle-Agent Model of Employment Relationship Outline the principal-agent model relating to the employment relationship, and describe how pay models can help overcome some of the problems of performance in developing country governments. Introduction Managing scarcity is a major concern both in the private and the public sector all around the world. As the cornerstone of the economic theory the efficient and effective use of the scarce resources has been, since the acknowledgment of this social science, a paramount responsibility for public officials. Whether it was on behalf of the absolutist ruler or about the peoples interest, managing the states resources is a craft that not only has evolved in its tools but also in the scope that it covers, as new necessities arise and evolve at the pace of civilization. In the following sections, we aim to cover the Principal-Agent Model relating it to the employment relationship within the public sector, for which we will develop the main characteristics of the model with a political economy perspective. As Solow (1974) acknowledges, the world has been consuming its exhaustible resources since the beginning of time, and as the process will continue and new necessities will emerge, the state in all its forms needs to enhance its output and efficiency to address these situations. As one of the main inputs for government delivery is human capital, the choice of a proper compensation scheme, with incentives effects considering performance and quality can provide significant effects on output (Lazear, 2000). From this perspective, we will cover different payment models and incentives as tools to achieve a better and wider output in the environment of developing economies where scarce resources are more acute and social needs are more demanding, focused in the provision of the basic elements and services to help people to develop. Finally, and after going through the theoretical ground of the Principal-Agent Model and the mentioned compensation methods, we will relate them with developing country experiences and outcomes in the framework of new public management where, working altogether with other theories and components that includes a varied mix of characteristics (Gruening, 2001) such as, budget cuts, privatization, user charges, competition, separation of politics and administration, performance measurement and improved accounting, among others that we can relate to the neo-liberalist agenda, that emphasises management tools in order to achieve the goal of better public sector performance. Principal-Agent Model In theory of delegation, the core idea of the Principal-Agent Model is that the Principal needs to delegate a certain activity or job because its too busy to do it by himself. This is made by hiring a third party or Agent who will be responsible to perform the defined activities, but as the Principal is busy, it also means that he cannot observe the Agent actions perfectly. So, several ways are to be considered to motivate the actions of the Agent to favour with her actions the interests of the Principal (Gibbons, 2017). To be defined as a Principal-Agent Model some necessary features or core assumptions are required. According to the settings explained by Miller (2005), first, the agent takes actions that establishes a payoff to the principal, along with a risk variable. Secondly, there exists information asymmetries as the principal can view the outcome provided by the agent but not the actions that the latter undertook. Moreover, in many cases, the associated costs of monitoring the agent actions can be prohibitively expensive. Third, there also exists asymmetry in the preferences as those of the agents, as are assumed to diverge from the principals preferences. Also, the agent is taken to be more risk-averse than the principal.   Fourth, the principal is expected to act rationally based upon coherent preferences and is able to take the initiative by offering a contract. Fifth, agent and principal have common knowledge about the game structure, the costs, probabilities of the different outcomes and other variables. Moreover, they are conscious of the agents rationality and her preferences regarding an incentive package that its expected utility is above the agents opportunity cost. Finally, the principal is assumed to have the ability to impose the best possible solution regarding the agents inferred best response equation. In other words, The principal is endowed with all of the bargaining power in this simple setting, and thus can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent (Sappington, 1991, p. 47). Furthermore, Miller (2005) defines, from the above-mentioned assumptions, two initial results. Outcome-based incentives, to partially overcome any moral hazard problems despite information asymmetries. And, Efficiency Trade-Offs, as moral hazard sets boundaries to both transaction efficiency and the principals benefits. Efficiency in incentives endures a trade-off with risk-bearing efficiency, and the best trade-off or second best solution must involve risky outcome-based bonuses for the risk-averse agent (Shavell, 1979 in Miller, 2005). Asymmetries and Costs The relationship between the principal and the agent is not exempt of unbalances of power that operate in both ways. The former is threatened by moral hazard or informational asymmetries regarding the actions that are to be undertook by the agent. To balance this situation, the theory presumes that the principal will try to narrow these asymmetries by installing information systems and monitoring the agent. Also, they will offer incentives as a way to align the parties interests. In this alignment, principals compensate the agents not only for the collaboration agreement but for the actual result of this enterprise, performing contracts that are output oriented (Shapiro, 2005). Moreover, given the insurmountably costs of monitoring the agent, or public servant, the outcome based contract is a clear alternative against a retribution based on actions (Miller, 2005). In the public-sector sphere, if the official fails in his task, e.g. inclusive poverty alleviation programme, must be removed from office even if his actions were in the best interests of the public. This is not done out of vengeance, but as an incentive for future officials under the same information asymmetry and output-based contracts. Of course, if the programme succeeds, the official must be rewarded. This shows that there is inefficiency along the process, even though the output-based contract succeeds in reducing the moral hazard problem, it does it whilst recognizes the inefficiencies that come along with the solutions achieved, that in most cases are not Pareto-optimal in the relationship between the agent and the principal (Downs and Rocke, 1994). Moral hazard is a key component in the contract formulation. The principals are assumed to be risk neutral and the agents risk averse, as they have bet all in into the contract with the principal, the information asymmetry plays an important part as the agent will do things that might go against the principals goals in order to preserve themselves from risk. Thus, the importance to design tools to minimize this hazards (Shapiro, 2005). In addition, the principals are faced with situations that modify substantially the assumption that is the latter the one who is in control of creating incentives, specifying the preferences and making the contracts for the agents to follow. There exists many common situations in which principals need agents with expertise, or with experience that goes far beyond that of theirs, in this cases the asymmetry of information is reinforced by the shift in the asymmetry of power as it shifts from the principal to the agent (Shapiro, 2005) a common case observed with public officials and politicians. Therefore, by manipulating the incentives offered to the agent, the principal attempts to minimize agency costs or shirking, that is the losses assumed by the principal by her incapacity to align the self-interests of the agent with her owns (Miller, 2005). When it comes to the public service, two observations must be made. First, as there exists knowledge and information asymmetries and they are characteristic in many agency relationships that are opaque and quite difficult to be subject of surveillance, agents self-regulation provides a very important monitoring role. Secondly, many regulatory provisions and self-regulatory arrangements established to control agency relationships are as well agency relationships. Whether they are compliance officers, auditors, internal affairs departments, insurance companies, investment advisors or government regulators, the monitors act on behalf of the principals. Therefore, they also comprise agency problems (Shapiro, 2005). Shirking, cooptation or corruption becomes part of the equation. So, the question of Who monitors the monitors? (Shapiro, 1987) arises, creating a structure of agents controlling agents. The later question demands more attention from the political science view as sanctions are required to induce agents to properly perform their duties. Budget cuts, firing officials, recontracting or voting them out of office are ways used in the public sector to align the agents objectives with those of the principals. As Mitnick (1998, in Shapiro, 2005) explains, these situations inevitably comes with associated agency costs, when they are too high, either in political or economic terms, principals might choose not to expend resources on them. Furthermore, as politicians might not bear the burden of the consequences of the agents self-interested, opportunistic actions, the costs most likely are passed through to the public. This creates the perfect environment for increased laxity of monitoring activities in the public sector (Meier and Waterman, 1998). Contracts, Pay Models and Performance It is clear now that the channel to implement the required balances of power and influence is through the correct design of the contracts where the principals delegation to the agent will be embodied. Sadly, there is not a golden rule for contract design as every relationship is different and requires diverse considerations to achieve the best possible outcome considering most of the contingencies. Nevertheless, there is a caveat to consider as there are substantially different scenarios between the contracts and incentives options for the public sector than those of the private, more flexible, one. We must remember that the beginnings of the new public management and the considerations of the principal-agent theory are rooted in the developments in management techniques provided by the private sector in its search for efficiency and productivity. For this particular reason, we cover the more standardized retributive models to, afterwards, be able to apply them to the public sector with the necessary considerations. One of the entrepreneurs in compensation techniques was Henry Ford who addressed the high rotation of personnel and absenteeism that his motor company suffered by increasing the hourly wages high above the average threshold in the industry. This basic action provided immediate effects as productivity, commitment increased whilst personnel rotation decreased. This decision, though basic today provided a clear example of what incentives can produce in a given organization. But, Fords times are over and the complexity of transactions, markets and peoples needs have evolved into a more sophisticated retribution design. A rather common output-based contract is the Piece-rate payment instead of the classic hourly payment. This kind of contract works for certain organizations, and has proven to be effective in the increase of productivity due to two components: the increased production per worker due to incentive effects and a natural shift towards more capable, results driven employees recruited to fill the posts of those that are unable to produce enough to maintain their previous level of income. This generates profits sharing between the company and the labour force as part of the productivity gains are split among them, whilst encouraging more ambitious workers to differentiate themselves, both characteristics are unable to be achieved with a basic salary retribution (Lazear, 2000). Is understood that covenants regarding quality and other issues must be addressed in the contract to avoid future backfires. There exist different alternatives of contracts regarding the agents retributions. But they all aim to be the optimal solution to the information asymmetry problem. Authors also suggest the analysis of retribution in a time frame perspective, where initially the agent will be paid a wage lower than his alternative wage, with the promise of future, career attached, above the threshold wages as an alternative to avoid shirking when monitoring the agents activities is imperfect. Moreover, this method of delayed-payment or bonding contract is efficient as it doesnt alter the present value of the best alternative compensation. Also, this system provides the principal with an additional tool which is the increasing cost of job loss to keep the agent focused on the principals objectives (Krueger, 1990). A tool that is also related with bonuses or options related compensations. In jobs that are capital intensive and highly routinized, there is also room for shirking, absenteeism, theft, high turnover, waste, misuse of equipment or poor service that have a significant effect on output and performance (Krueger, 1990). These situations observed in certain industries can be also seen in some public offices, with the condiment that in many cases there also exists the limitation of law and regulation regarding the protection of the public employment that creates a further layer of asymmetry in the principal-agent relationship. The relationship can be turned-over as the principal becomes the employees that are unionized and the agent, the organization for whom they work. In cases where it has full negotiation power for determining the labour contract, the unions will demand higher salaries and in-kind payments that goes straight against the goal of maximizing the output as the cost increases (Laffont and Martimore, 2001). Moreover, there exists the risks of overemployment due to the mentioned legislation coverage, that prevents the organization to restructure its personnel and achieve a maximization of output through increased productivity. As Shapiro (2005) acknowledges, over time the agents acquire influence over other groups than their principals that increases their protection against any sanction that might be cast upon them. And as in many cases agents -government officials or corporate directors- outlive their principals (politicians, shareholders), the balance of power may shift. Performance and Development From all the above covered, we clearly observe that performance enhancing measures are activities that arent free of charge. In fact, even in private companies the application of any structural change regarding increasing output or efficiency comes with stressful situations that might be so disruptive that can stop the process. This situation, when taken to the public sector, where the motors of change are elected official with a fixed term in office, provides situations that require strong commitment and enough negotiations skills to prove the workforce and the ultimate principals, the voters, of the necessity of change. In this section, we will cover the approach that developing countries have taken to address and minimize situations that reduce performance or hold back efficiency. Improving Health Service Delivery Performance enhancement is a key factor to achieve the health-associated Millennium Development Goals. Hence, looking for improved ways for service delivery is significantly important. A way to achieve this goals has been the application of government contracting with third parties such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) practitioners, universities or companies. As Loevinsohn and Harding (2005) expose, contracts for health service delivery provides some interesting characteristics. First, they ensure a more precise focus on measurable results, especially when the contracts are defined objectively with measurable outputs. Secondly, they overcome some constraints that can prevent governments to efficiently use the available resources, such as the ones mentioned in the previous section. Third, the use of the private sectors flexibility can improve service delivery. Fourth, increased autonomy and decentralization in the decision-making process allows a faster response to peoples ne eds. Fifth, as contracting is through public offers, it will increase the efficiency because of price competition or, if its recruiting for staff, will attract better qualified agents. Finally, as these activities are outsourced in its execution allows governments to focus more on its other roles, such as planning, financing, regulation and more varied public health functions. Of course, in addition to the caveats covered in this paper, the thought of contracting non-state institutions to perform public activities comes with other difficulties as contracting should cover a sufficiently large scale to make a difference in aggregate service output. Which in turn, leads to both more expensive contracts and a shift in the balance of power due to principals (government) limited capacity to manage this contracts in the most efficient way once the service is instituted. Hence, there will be unsustainability risks in the contracting (Loevinsohn and Harding, 2005). However, governments have different types of contracts to provide a principal-agent relationship with positive results for society. In a service delivery contract, the state decides the services to be provided, where, and the integration scale in the infrastructure and supply management, where, personnel, equipment or consumables will be, or provided. There are intermediate options such as a management contract, where the agent will take over on the government health workers and take care of the increase in the salary, which will be linked to outcome based indicators (Loevinsohn and Harding, 2005). In this case, there is a limited effect in the principals shift of power as the agent remains in a rather weak position as it can be dismissed if does not accomplish the performance levels pre-contracted. When contrasted with some average scenarios in many developing countries, where the public sector underperforms or barely function at all, due to factors such as poverty, corruption, chronical economic crisis and political instability. Public officials morale is undermined and in some situations absenteeism increases or there are a lack of tasks or resources to work with, pervasive corruption and rent seeking characterises the public sector in many places in the world (Grindle, 1997). Reforms to increase performance and effectiveness are demanded both by the public and by the politicians, whos agency contract with society depends on their performance. Nevertheless, Loevinsohn and Harding (2005) research provides evidence of the impressive improvements achieved by government contracting with third parties in the performance of the service delivery. Whether primary health care in Guatemala or nutrition programmes in Africa, contracting yielded positive results. In some case studies the contractors were proven to be more effective than the state agencies, regarding several measures on quality of service and coverage. As an example, in India a NGO was able to deliver an increase of 14% in tuberculosis treatment completion rates at a lower cost than the public services in a nearby area (Murthy et al. 2001). Contracting under specific, results driven conditions has proven to deliver impressive and rapid results. The studies made on programmes that are ongoing suggest that there is a link between the high performing programmes with increased autonomy given to contractors, cases such as Cambodia, where Rural Primary Health Provision and District Hospitals, where output-based service delivery contracts provided better results than traditional management contracts. A result consistent with the characteristics of hospital services where autonomy in the workforce management is significantly important to improve performance (Harding and Preker, 2003). It is to be expected to generate controversy by contracting with non-governmental institutions to provide services. Critics often relate this movements as pro neo-liberal desires of privatization, while financing them with public resources with the objective to limit the government involvement in services such as health care or education. However, some programmes are designed and implemented due to internal analysis of the lack of expertise or proper resources to cover and deliver a defined set of services, a process that can lead to more efficient expenditures without reducing the public expenditure for that item (Loevinsohn and Harding, 2005). Hence, increasing performance and output. The above-mentioned examples are among many others where new public management techniques or concepts apply. The Principal-Agent model expressed in the relationship between the state and a third party specialized in service delivery shows that such a complex relationship should be followed in those activities that allow to be critically measurable, without being put through subjectivities in the performance analysis. When the Principal-Agent relationship is put under the scope of political science there are interesting considerations to be made. When we analyse the delegation process or the objective we might observe that maybe the goal is to provide an enhanced credibility in the commitments made, or to avoid the cost of unpopular policies. Instead of aligning the interests of the agents with theirs, principals who seek credibility from their agents choose other agents with different preferences regarding policies and provide them with considerable autonomy and discretion as a way to provide contracts with independence whilst seeking accountability for their actions (Majone, 2001 in Shapiro, 2005). As we can see, contracting under the principal-agent model is not a simple activity. There are so many variables that can affect the efficiency of the objective rather than its effectiveness, that it proves complicated to perform corrective measures. Therefore, the monitor eye is so important. The threat of future sanctions provides the agents, and in the public arena, some principals, with the incentives to perform their activities properly. Moreover, in democracies, where congressional oversight is available, and where effective incentives systems are applied, less often sanctions should be observed in the form of hearings and investigations. Direct and continuous monitoring of inputs rather than results proves to be an inefficient tool for controlling the agent (Miller, 2005). This provides a further incentive for the proper implementation and design of outcome-based contracts. Conclusion In the present paper, we have gone through the standard framework of the Principal-Agent model, where we have covered the technical requirements to be met in order to perform this kind of contracts. Always from the basis that is the Principals need of delegation of a certain activity, the trigger for entering in this contract based relationship in which there exists characteristics such as information asymmetries, efficiency trade-offs and relatively high monitoring costs associated. Furthermore, we have gone into a deeper analysis of the causes and costs related to the different asymmetries that can be observed in the principal-agent relationship and the particular impact that this can cause in contracts performed with the public sector. For which we have also covered the mainstream contract typology, the intrinsic objectives of the correct formulation of the agreement in order to avoid shirking and goals divergences. To finally, approach performance issues with developing country experiences related to the health sector as it is one of the public services that can have its output clearly and objectively measured without further complications or subjectivities. From all the above covered, we clearly can see that Principal-Agent contracts applied to governments is possible and yields positive results. But, it is also clear that is not an easy or systematic task. As it requires many considerations and attention to the caveats mentioned and many others that can apply due to the intrinsic characteristics of the tasks and the outcomes negotiated. We must also bear in mind that this kind of contracts also bear internal difficulties within the government agencies as not all of them are fit to be part of this kind of arrangements. In addition, we cannot think of implementing an effective principal-agent relationship without pursuing other structural changes in the governmental structures. As Robert McNamara, former president of the World Bank, claimed in most countries, the centralized administration of scarce resources both money and skills has usually resulted in most of them being allocated to a small group of the rich and powerful. This is not surprising since economic rationalizing, political pressure and selfish interest often conspire to the detriment of the poor. [à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦] experience shows that there is a greater chance of success if institutions provide for popular participation, local leadership and decentralization of authority (World Bank, 1975, p.93). Moreover, Rondinelli (1981) focuses on the efficient delivery of services depending upon the effective organization at community levels to have a strong interaction with the agencies in charge of service delivery to establish priorities and set objectives. This paper aimed to observe the impact of the Principal-Agent Model as a tool to gain in efficiency and increase performance levels in the public sector. From all the above covered, we can see that, if properly implemented and with the necessary systemic view, this incentive-based tool is strong enough to help government agencies to increase their output and provide better services for the community. Again, is not the easy path, but it can payoff. References Downs, George W. and Rocke, David M. (1994) Conflict, agency and gambling for resurrection: The principal-agent problem goes to war. American Journal of Political Science. Vol. 38 pp. 362-380. Gibbons, Robert (2017) Lecture Note 1: Agency Theory. MBA Course 15.903: Organizational Economics and Corporate Strategy. MIT Sloan School of Management. Massachusetts. Grindle, Merilee S. (1997) Divergent Cultures? When Public Organizations Perform Well in Developing Countries. World Development. Vol. 25, pp. 481-495. Gruening, Gernod (2001). Origin and theoretical basis of New Public Management. International Public Management Journal 4 (2001) 1-25. Harding, April and Preker, Alexander S. (2003) Innovations in Health Service Delivery: The Corporatization of Public Hospitals. Health, Nutrition, and Population. World Bank. Washington D.C. Krueger, Alan B. (1990) Ownership, Agency and Wages: An examination of franchising in the Fast food industry. National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper No. 3.334. Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Martimore, David (2001) The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. Princeton University Press. New Jersey. Lazear, Edward P. (2000) Performance Pay and Productivity. The American Economic Review. Vol. 90, pp. 1346-1361. Loevinsohn, Benjamin and Harding, April (2005) Buying results? Contracting for health service delivery in developing countries. The Lancet. Vol. 366, pp. 676-681. Meier, Kenneth J. and Waterman, Richard W. (1998) Principal-agent models: an expansion? Journal of Public Administration and Research Theory. Vol. 8, pp. 173-202. Miller, Gary J. (2005) The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models. Annual Review of Political Science. Vol. 8, pp. 203-225. Murthy K.J.R., Frieden T.R., Yazdani A. and Hreshikesh P. (2001) Public private partnership in tuberculosis control: experience in Hyderabad, India. The International Journal of Tuberculosis and Lung Disease. Vol. 5, pp. 354 -359. Sappington, David E. M. (1991) Incentives in principal-agent relationships. Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 5, pp. 45-66. Shapiro, Susan P. (1987) The social control of impersonal trust. American Journal of Sociology. Vol. 93, pp. 623-658. Rondinelli, Dennis A. (1981) Government Decentralization in Comparative Perspective: Theory and Practice in Developing Countries. International Review of Administrative Sciences. Vol. 47, pp. 133-145. Shapiro, Susan P. (2005) Agency Theory. Annual Review of Sociology. Vol. 30, pp. 263-284. Solow, Robert M. (1974) The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics. The American Economic Review. Vol. 64, pp. 1-14. World Bank (1975) The Assault on World Poverty. John Hopkins University Press. Baltimore.

Steven Crane’s Maggie: A Girl of the Streets :: Maggie: A Girl Of The Streets

Steven Crane’s Maggie A Girl Of The Streets Many times in novels, authors use themes to support subjects written for the book as a whole. In Steven Crane’s Maggie A Girl Of The Streets , he uses the theme hypocrisy to better portray the family’s life style and the unfair frustration it gives Maggie because of it. Her brother Jimmy and mother Mary Johnson are prime examples of this theme. Throughout the novel, both characters say one thing and do the exact opposite to Maggie without a residue of guilt in their actions. Which further proves the point that actions are as strong as words, especially when it comes from the only people you trust and care for. Early in the novel, Jimmy grew up to fill the negative regions of his fathers footsteps. He would come home late in the night passed out drunk. He loved to make even strangers mad, just to take a shot at them. He knew he would never have a chance to get out of the Bowery with a future, so to earn as much respect as he could so he basically was a insensitive jerk to the world. But nevertheless the only one in his surroundings who actually showed love or any type of support to him was his younger sister Maggie. Jimmy also never had any good role models to look up to, so he took his defensive violent side out on anyone, even his mother when agitated. One of the bigger problems Jimmy later thrived on was to sweet talk some innocent girls over time to basically sleep with him. Of course they would end up penniless and pregnant with not enough food for themselves and Jimmy would be out the door never to be seen again. As time went by Maggie was thought wrongly to be in a similar situation with the man of her dreams, Pete. She was never in the place the girls with Jimmy were in, just out late one night with her date Pete. And since the respect of your community was all anyone had, when word of her situation came up things were assumed and her respect was taken from her. At first hearing of this, Jimmy did what most protective brothers do which is get angry at the guy who took part, but then something strange happened. In his words he said â€Å"I’ll kill deh jay! Dat’s what I’ll do! I’ll kill the jay!† (Crane 43). Steven Crane’s Maggie: A Girl of the Streets :: Maggie: A Girl Of The Streets Steven Crane’s Maggie A Girl Of The Streets Many times in novels, authors use themes to support subjects written for the book as a whole. In Steven Crane’s Maggie A Girl Of The Streets , he uses the theme hypocrisy to better portray the family’s life style and the unfair frustration it gives Maggie because of it. Her brother Jimmy and mother Mary Johnson are prime examples of this theme. Throughout the novel, both characters say one thing and do the exact opposite to Maggie without a residue of guilt in their actions. Which further proves the point that actions are as strong as words, especially when it comes from the only people you trust and care for. Early in the novel, Jimmy grew up to fill the negative regions of his fathers footsteps. He would come home late in the night passed out drunk. He loved to make even strangers mad, just to take a shot at them. He knew he would never have a chance to get out of the Bowery with a future, so to earn as much respect as he could so he basically was a insensitive jerk to the world. But nevertheless the only one in his surroundings who actually showed love or any type of support to him was his younger sister Maggie. Jimmy also never had any good role models to look up to, so he took his defensive violent side out on anyone, even his mother when agitated. One of the bigger problems Jimmy later thrived on was to sweet talk some innocent girls over time to basically sleep with him. Of course they would end up penniless and pregnant with not enough food for themselves and Jimmy would be out the door never to be seen again. As time went by Maggie was thought wrongly to be in a similar situation with the man of her dreams, Pete. She was never in the place the girls with Jimmy were in, just out late one night with her date Pete. And since the respect of your community was all anyone had, when word of her situation came up things were assumed and her respect was taken from her. At first hearing of this, Jimmy did what most protective brothers do which is get angry at the guy who took part, but then something strange happened. In his words he said â€Å"I’ll kill deh jay! Dat’s what I’ll do! I’ll kill the jay!† (Crane 43).

Marx and Law

JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY VOLUME 20, NUMBER 4, WINTER 1993 0263-323X Marx and Law ANDREW VINCENT* There is no sense in which Marx can be described as just a legal theorist. He did not write any systematic works on legal science or jurisprudence; however, his observations on law are both immensely penetrating and contain an extremely subtle interweaving of philosophical, political, economic, and legal strands. Marx was also at the centre of many crucial intellectual and political debates of his time.In order to try to unpack some of these debates, elucidate his views on law, and retain some overall clarity, I divide my remarks into five sections, which will inevitably overlap. The sections covered are: the problems of discussing Marxist jurisprudence; the philosophical background to the analysis of law and the state; materialism, political economy, and law; base, superstructure, and the ideology of law; and finally, law, politics, and the state. PROBLEMS OF MARXIST JURISPRUDENCE Ther e are a number of problems for any student of jurisprudence or politics trying to grasp Marx's approach to law. First, there is the puzzling point that neither Marx nor Engels had a positive normative theory of law, crime or deviance. In fact, much of the time Marx appears predisposed simply to ignore the question of law as peripheral, or at least to treat crime as a symptom of the conflict within a class-based society. ‘ He certainly offers no clear encompassing definition of law. Marx's jurisprudential thought is often premised upon a critique of law per se, and what he has to say tends to be overwhelmingly negative in character.This is fine if one's purpose is ‘critique' and nothing else, but it is a definite handicap if one wishes to say something more positive about the nature of law, law reform rather than its overthrow, or the future of law (e. specially if one believes that law has a future role in society). A second problem relates to the sources for Marx's obse rvations on law. It has already been noted that Marx did not have a normative theory of law. It is also clear that what he does say about law, by way of negative critique, does not appear in any systematic format. There are works which begin to *School of European Studies, University of Wales, Cardiff CF1 3 YQ, Wales 371 C Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1993. 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 JF, UK and 238 Main Street. Cambridge. MA 02142. USA HeinOnline — 20 J. L. & Soc'y 371 1993 say something more systematic, like The German Ideology. However, Marx never allowed its publication in his lifetime and it is commonly dismissed (although not by all writers by any means) as either a work of immature juvenilia or a flawed piece of philosophical polemic which does not come up 3 to the systematic and scientific standards of Capital.Marx, it is also commonly asserted, had intended to write a work on law and the state 4 (possibly as an extension of Capital), but he never realized his ambition. Thus, in consequence, the writings and observations on law that we do have are incomplete and must be picked out from a diverse body of writings. Marx's writings are in fact markedly eclectic and can be roughly divided into four often overlapping types: first, the early, more philosophicallyinclined pieces, clearly more inspired by the German philosopher G.W. F. Hegel. Under this rubric would be included the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844), The Holy Family (1844), The German Ideology (1845/6), and The Poverty of Philosophy (1847). The second type of writing is the polemical pieces written for particular political objectives. The most famous of these is the Communist Manifesto (1847/8). The overt character of these polemical writings- despite their wide dissemination, immense influence, and popularity – is their simplification of issues and doctrines.This can be a problem in assessing what Marx actually believed, rather than what he needed to put forward for polemical thrust and cogency. The third group of writings relate to Marx's observations on particular historical events. Probably the most famous of these, and the most convoluted and ambiguous, is the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte(1852). The writings in this context employ Marx's immensely sophisticated method of close historical analysis, although the final upshot of such pieces has given rise to many hostages to fortune especially over the theory of law and the state.The final group of writings settle upon his systematic economic theories. The most famous of these are the earlier Grundrisse (1857/8) and the later Capital (1867-85), which remained incomplete at Marx's death. In sum, Marx's observations on law must be, and usually are, picked out from these diverse writings. It is hardly surprising that there should be oddities, fierce contestation, and discrepancies over such fragments. A related point to the diversity of the above writings is the fact that many commentators on Marx arg ue that there is a marked shift or break in his perspective.The break usually occurs between the ‘younger' and ‘older' Marx. The character of the shift, which was called the ‘epistemological break' by the French Marxist, Louis Althusser, is between an earlier philosophically and morally-inclined Marx, clearly inspired by Hegel, and the mature Marx, focused on political economy and intent upon constructing 5 an empirically-based social and economic science of history and society. This judgement on the distinction between the late and early Marx is often supposed to direct our attention to the late Marx and a consequent dismissal of the early philosophical Marx.In this reading, Marx's early interest in ‘alienation' is superseded by a social scientific theory of economic ‘exploitation'. The development of a clear vision of the early Marx was perhaps 372  © Basil Blackwell Ltd. HeinOnline — 20 J. L. & Soc'y 372 1993 partially hampered by the fact t hat the key early writings – the Economic and PhilosophicalManuscripts – were not actually discovered and published till the 1920s. Marx certainly never contemplated their publication during his lifetime.Whether one takes the epistemological break seriously or not, there are undoubtedly changes in Marx's perspective on many issues including law. 6 These cannot be ignored by the student of Marx, although what one reads into these changes remains contestable. Another problem concerns Marx's intellectual relation with Friedrich Engels. There has been a strong tendency in Marxist writings to associate the two men closely with one pristine doctrine. It appears that in fact Marx's definite turn to economics (political economy) was confirmed through his initial contact with Engels' writings.As editor of the Deutsch-Franziisische Jahrbiicherin Paris, in November 1843, Marx had received an article from Engels, entitled ‘Outline of a Critique of Political Economy', which s timulated the economic turn in his own work. Their working relation began a year later in 1844. 1 However, despite their collaboration on works like The German Ideology and The Communist Manifesto, it is far from clear that we should associate them, especially on questions of their philosophical beliefs or their subsequent ideas on law and the state.This point has been made by a number of scholars, although it is still far from resolved. It is clear, for example, that Marx did not formulate a lucid doctrine of materialism, whereas Engels clearly lays out such a doctrine, particularly in popularizing works like Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (1880), the Anti-Diihring (1885) and the Dialectics of Nature. Marx nowhere used terms like ‘dialectical materialism' or ‘historical materialism'. Neither did he coin terms (which are relevant to the discussion of law) like the ‘withering away of the state'.This latter idea, again, was Engels's terminology from the Anti-Diihr ing. Marx did not apply the notion of dialectics to nature itself. His belief remained firmly fixed in the social sphere of human emancipation. Engels was far more ambitious, some would say foolhardy, extending dialectics to the natural world. ‘ The ultimate consequence of Engels's doctrine was a virtual reenactment of an older form of mechanistic materialism resonant of the French Enlightenment, which Marx had attacked in his early unpublished work, the Theses on Feuerbach.Engels's doctrines later became established in the writings of Lenin, particularly Lenin's philosophical work Materialism and Empirio-Criticism and Plekhanov's Materialism Militant, and subsequently it dominated much of the theoretical output of the Second International and the leading Marxist party of the time in Germany – the Sozialdemokratische ParteiDeutschlands(SPD). 9 However, Marx's theory of knowledge, if it can be summarized, hung uneasily between a classical materialism and an idiosyncratic use of Hegelian idealism.One can overemphasize the differences between Engels and Marx; however, we ignore them at our cost. If we are trying to understand Marx, it is not wise to place too much reliance on Engels's own personal output. One final problem concerns Marx's use of the concept of law itself. There are two terminological points to note here. The first concerns the German 373 D Basil Blackwell Ltd. HeinOnline — 20 J. L. & Soc'y 373 1993 word, Recht. It is virtually equivalent to the terms jus, droit or diritto, as distinct from lex, loi or legge. This distinction does not really work in English.Recht in German is not limited to law or jurisprudence but can encompass the issues of civil law, justice, right, and morality. In Hegel, the initial focus of Marx's interest in law, Recht embodied the above themes, but also what he called the ‘ethical life', the state and, ultimately, aspects of world history. In fact, the work on which Marx spent so much time in his early years, Hegel's Grundlinien der Philosophiedes Rechts, is sometimes translated as The Philosophy of Law, The Philosophy of the State and, more usually, The Philosophy of Right. 0 It is important to bear in mind this ambiguity when considering Marx's observations on law (as Recht); when Marx addresses law, it is not strictly parallel to English usage. The above connects up with the second point, which is often confusing to audiences from the British or Anglo-Saxon legal traditions. Hegel's work, referred to above, was, as much as anything else, a theory or philosophy of the state. This is encompassed, to some extent, in the broad use of the term Recht. Thus, the treatment of the state might be said, inclusively, to be also a treatment of law.This kind of approach resonates more with the Roman law and civil law traditions of continental Europe than with the common law tradition of Britain. † However, it is worth taking note of this point since it throws a ray of light on so me of Marx's writings; namely, his critique of the state is to a large extent also a critique of law. ‘2 One small biographical detail could be added here, which might add some substance to this point. When Marx was writing in a more reflective way on the state and law, he was in Germany and France.His early legal training had been in Germany (although he gave it up for philosophy) and he was reflecting and writing within the Hegelian genre. Much later in his life, in the late 1870s, when puzzling over whether to write more on law and the state, he had been living and working for a number of years in Britain, enough time to pick up on the peculiarities and idiosyncracies of the English legal tradition and its odd relation to the state. This might explain some of his later ambiguities, as opposed to his earlier certainties, on the state. Finally, the interest in Marx on law, despite the ork of the Soviet jurist Evgeny Pashunakis in the 1920s and 1930s, and Karl Renner in Austri a, was not really a subject of wide-ranging debate until the 1970s. As Maureen Cain and Alan Hunt have commented: the prevailing trend from the 1930s to the 1960s displayed an almost exclusive emphasis on the repressive or coercive character of law, conceived as the direct embodiment of the interests of the ruling class. In this conception law itself is unproblematic: the analysis of legal development or new legislation has the task merely of exposing the class interest 3 contained in them.What was discovered in the 1970s, presumably under the impact of the surge of interest in the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, was the conception of law as ideology and, in consequence, law as a crucial part of the intellectual hegemony of capitalist societies. In this sense, the more wide-ranging and 374 (D Basil Blackwell Ltd. HeinOnline — 20 J. L. & Soc'y 374 1993 popular interest in Marx on law is a relatively recent development. It is thus very tempting, in dealing with this topic, to refer to the developments in Marxism itself to the present day.The major danger with this path is that the discussion can become wholly enmeshed in the recent material and Marx becomes a distant memory. I have tried to avoid this trap here. Although contemporary developments are not ignored, the principal focus is on Marx's writings. THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND TO THE ANALYSIS OF LAW AND THE STATE There are three points to note concerning Marx's philosophical background which are relevant for his later project and his overall understanding of law. First, the premises for his critique of law are derived from his initial philosophical criticism of religion and the state.Secondly, his analysis of the conception of ideology and the ‘illusory' character of bourgeois thought (including law) lies in early essays like ‘On the Jewish Question'. Finally, his first inkling of the economic roots to social and political thought can also be found in his early essays – particu larly the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts and his article on ‘Law on Thefts of Wood' in the Rheinische Zeitung (1842). 1 take the first two issues as most significant. The last point, to a large degree, follows from the first two.From the late 1830s, Marx had determined to get to know Hegel ‘from beginning to end'. 4 Together with Bruno and Edgar Bauer, Arnold Ruge, Max Stirner, and Ludwig Feuerbach (the so-called young Hegelians), Marx studied Hegel's works assiduously through the late 1830s and early 1840s. Feuerbach was the most influential figure in the group. Initially he had been a disciple of Hegel's philosophy, and in some ways he never abandoned it. 5 Feuerbach, however, did engage in a dialectical critique of Hegel – using Hegel's own method to criticize him.Hegel's definition of humanity through its thinking abilities, specifically through the notion of Spirit (Geist), is, for Feuerbach, one step short of reality – or, at least, it is inve rted reality. Hegel explained humanity through consciousness (or mind); however, for Feuerbach, it is sensuous and materially-rooted humans who think, not some abstract consciousness or mind. The transcendental ego of Kant, the absolute ego of Fichte, or Hegel's notion of Spirit (the great themes of German philosophy) were all seen by Feuerbach as sensuous human creations.Thus, the basis of Feuerbach's critique of Hegel is that the latter was offering, unwittingly, an ‘esoteric theology'. Humans are not vehicles for Spirit (Geist); rather, humans create the notion of Spirit. In fact, for Feuerbach, humans create God in their own image. Thus, in Hegel, ‘What was a logic of Being becomes [in Feuerbach] a psychology of human concept formation'. 6 Philosophy, in actuality, reflects human wants and needs. This critique of Hegel's ontology was directly related to Feuerbach's equally important critique of religion in The Essence of Christianity. Hegel's 375 n Basil Blackel1 I t dHeinOnline — 20 J. L. & Soc'y 375 1993 philosophy is, in point, interpreted as the last speculative outpost of God. Speculative philosophy and religion needed to be led from the realm of mental abstractions into the realm of sensuous humanity. For Feuerbach, in essence, all ‘theology is anthropology'. The true object of religion is not God but idealized humanity. Religion is the alienated form of the individual's recognition of his or her own nature. God is the creation of the human imagination, unknowingly idealizing itself. Thus, Feuerbach claimed that some radical demythologizing was needed.Love of God is really love of humanity in symbolic inverted form. Theology is kind of psychic pathology. The separation between God and humanity is really a separation within humanity itself. Religion is a form of alienation from our essential natures. The demythologizing was to be accomplished by the technique Feuerbach called ‘transformative criticism', namely, the interc hanging of the subject and predicate of propositions. For example, an understanding of God is not crucial for understanding humanity; conversely, an understanding of humanity is crucial for understanding the idea of God.The real subject is humanity, the predicate is God. These arguments affected profoundly the thinking of the young Hegelians. Marx, particularly, was initially enthralled, but soon turned to his own critique of the young Hegelians, especially Feuerbach. In his Theses of Feuerbach, he argued that Feuerbach's great achievement had been to bring holy ideas down to earth. However, he had retained an abstract materialism and theoretical humanism. What was needed was a practical humanism and a new understanding of materialism which took account of the social and economic reality.Philosophy must be moved away from mental abstractions and contemplation into the realm of social, political, and economic realities. Feuerbach was thus also subject to the demystification of transf ormative criticism. Practical and sensuous humanity, embroiled in economic and social realities, is the real subject, not theoretical humanity. I7 This critique of Feuerbach also forms the basis for Marx's critique of Hegel, religion and, finally, the state and law. It also led him to his crucial life project – the study 6f political economy. Marx accepted, implicitly, one theme in both Hegel and Feuerbach.Philosophy is about emancipating human beings. History was imbued with teleological significance as to the growing possibility for and realization of freedom, although this theme become very shrouded in his later writings. Religion purported to be about emancipation; however, for Marx, again, the reality was inverted. As he stated: ‘The criticism of religion ends with the doctrine that man is the highest being for man'. 8 Religion per se could not be overcome by simply drawing people's attention to its inverted logic (with due respect to Feuerbach).For Marx, one had t o grasp, critically, the social, political, and economic roots as to why people sought consolation in religion. A criticism of religion was, in essence, social and economic criticism. This exactly paralleled his criticisms of Hegel's notion of the state. For Hegel, humans were self-constituting and self-producing creatures. There was no sense in which we were simply the passive products of historical 376 D Basil Blackwell Ltd. HeinOnline — 20 J. L. & Soc'y 376 1993 forces. For Marx, Hegel's view was correct, but again the reality had been inverted.Hegel's Geist (Spirit or Mind) was really labouring humanity. Hegel, for Marx, made the ‘exoteric esoteric'. 9 Hegel had grasped the centrality of labour (self-production) but only in its mental form (in consciousness). Thus, Marx refers to Hegel's philosophy as ‘concealed criticism that is still obscure to itself. 20 For Marx, humans produce themselves by actual labour and through the ensuing social relations in the wor ld. Thus, Marx moved from regarding Hegel's philosophy as an esoteric psychology gradually to regard it as an esoteric economic thesis.Hegel's philosophy of the state (and law) had a correct content but in an inverted and mystified form. Marx in fact treats Hegel's Rechtsphilosophieas summing up German reality at that time (in its mystified form). As Marx put it: The criticism of German philosophy of the state and of law which was given its most consistent, richest and final version by Hegel, is †¦ the critical analysis of the modem state and the reality that depends upon it'. 21 Hegel had argued that humanity and civil society were the product of the state.The state is seen to stand above the conflicts of society. However, for Marx, again the reverse is true. Individuals in civil society, embroiled in economic forces and classes, and hedged about by private property rights, produce the state which, of necessity, reflects differential and unequal property relations and powers. Abstract property rights are embodied in the state. The state exists to maintain this interest. The modern state gives people legal rights and freedoms, premised on the idea of humans possessing property.However, such property is of necessity premised upon the alienation and denial of such freedom to a large proportion of the population. As Marx observed, the critic must now grasp ‘the essential connection of private property, selfishness, the separation of labour, capital and landed property, of exchange and competition, of the value and degradation of man'. 22 The logic of private property is the same as that logic of religion. As human beings alienate their essence into God, so workers alienate their essence into the production of goods.Workers, in receipt of wages, only secure a small proportion of what they produce. Thus, they alienate their essence into goods which others consume, use or embody in their private property – a property upheld by the state and legal s ystem. Moving now to the second point of this section, Marx's early essay ‘On the Jewish Question' deals, on the surface, with question of the repeal of legal disabilities for Jews in Germany. The essay is interesting on a number of counts; however, one point will suffice for the present discussion.Marx indicates that the illusions that were to be found in the religious consciousness could also be found in law. The basic point was that humans turned to religion in particular historical circumstances. Young Hegelians, like Bruno Bauer, had argued that the demands for Jewish emancipation precluded genuine emancipation, since the demand was formulated in religious terms namely, Jews. The state, for Bauer, must abolish all religious categories. The secular state provided the real solution for Bauer. Marx responded to this by 377 C) Basil Blackwell Ltd. HeinOnline — 20 J. L. & Soc'y 377 1993 rguing that religion per se was not the problem, but, rather, the state and legal sy stem itself. Religion is an illusory (if crucially important) pathology, but it is a reflection of a broader ‘illusion' pathology within the secular state. A secular state does not free human beings. Rather, the state embodies as many, if not more illusions than religion; illusions of secular states are structurally similar, and, in fact, related to religion. As Marx put it, in somewhat tortuous prose: We do not insist that they must abolish their religious limitations in order to abolish secular limitations.We insist that they abolish their religious limitations as soon as they abolish their secular limitations. We do not change secular questions into theological ones. We change theological questions into secular ones. History has for long enough been resolved into superstition: we now resolve superstition into history †¦ We criticize the religious weakness of the political state by criticizing the secular construction of the 23 political state without regard to its reli gious weaknesses. In short, for Marx, the political world of the secular modern state was as much a tissue of illusions as religion. 4 Underpinning the modern state are the illusions about private property and commerce, and the legal structures which uphold them. The final theme, with regard to his early writing, concerns his essay on the ‘Theft of Wood' in the Rheinische Zeitung in late 1842. The ‘Wood Theft' essay, as Marx later observed, was the first time that he saw clearly the socioeconomic issues which underpinned law (viewed through the lenses of the transition from feudalism to capitalism). The common feudal and customary right of gathering wood was effectively being ‘privatized' by commercial society.Rural poverty was itself the product of the redefinition of property as ‘private property'. In this sense, law was facilitating capitalism. Oddly, in this essay, Marx's solution was a restoration of older customary rights (although a slightly odd use of them) against the new right of private property. As he put it: ‘We reclaim for poverty the right of custom which is not a local one 5 but which is that of poverty in all lands'. 2 It is worth noting, though, that many of Marx's early writings do not envisage the abandonment of law or the state.He adopts, in fact, a quasi-natural law or customary law position (from a strictly secularist position), arguing, in essence, that certain newer laws are not really valid or real in the context of what real law ‘ought' to be like – namely law ought to be, as Marx put it, ‘the positive existence of freedom'. 26 It is also clear that he was not envisaging the abolition of the state; conversely, he anticipated a more radical democratic state upholding the fundamental rights and freedoms of the masses. In many ways these uasi-natural law themes and radicalization and democratization of the state do not disappear in his later writings; rather, they are submerged below the intellectual surface. The surface, in many later writings, becomes more positivist and economic in character; however, the underlying themes of human emancipation as a genuine need of human nature, the correct ways in which humans ‘ought' to act towards each other, and the future structural character of society, still subsist, but certainly not in any easy or comfortable relation to the positivism. 378 (D Basil Blackwell Ltd.HeinOnline — 20 J. L. & Soc'y 378 1993 MATERIALISM, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND LAW Marx was a materialist of sorts, although, as pointed out earlier, he never described himself as a historical or dialectical materialist. There are various senses which can be attached to the term materialism. Marx had no interest in materialism in the colloquial sense of a ‘seeking after consumer goods' which we might now call consumerism. Neither does he have much interest in mechanistic Enlightenment materialism, seeking to explain humanity via certain mechanical analogies – l'homme de machine.Neither strict physical 2 materialism nor behaviouralism were of any interest. 7 Marx's concern with materialism must be set against his reaction to Hegel's idealism, as examined in the previous section. Put at its simplest, Marx wanted to insist that human beings must subsist (and labour to subsist) before they cognitively speculate or think a great deal about their condition. Our social and economic being is thus prior to our reflective consciousness. The material conditions of our lives form the true basis for both our cognitive life and our social and political structures.We can observe here the ‘transformative criticism' at work again in the basic rudiments of Marx's thought. The ‘subject' is not self-conscious thought, nor is material life the ‘predicate': the converse is true. Subject and predicate must be transformed. It is important to bear this method in mind: namely, that Marx comes to his basic materialist conclusi ons from a philosophical direction. Marx does not suddenly ‘see the empirical light' on some Damascus road or come to such conclusions from empirical observation.His route to such premises is philosophical. One problem here is that even if we focus on Marx's particular type of materialism there are still distinct and competing versions of it. We might call these the stricter and looser versions. We will encounter parallels to this distinction in other areas of Marx's thought and there remains considerable debate as to where Marx's sympathies lay. The stricter materialism might be called ‘unidirectional determinism'. Material conditions causally determine thought and political and social structures.This is the dimension that Engels, Lenin, Plekhanov, and Kautsky picked up on, and it reappears in structuralist Marxism, amongst other varieties in the later twentieth century. This materialism looks, and occasionally tries to act more like a natural science. † In some m ore recent analyses of Marx it is connected to the idea of the ‘epistemological break'; that is, the mature Marx is the ‘scientist' and ‘unidirectional determinist'. The alternative looser materialism can be observed in the elusive Marxist doctrine of ‘praxis' (where ‘theory' and ‘practice' have a symbiotic and reciprocal relation).The basic logic of a praxis argument denies the basic premise of the unidirectionality claim; that is, it asserts that reflective thought and consciousness (as embodied in philosophical, economic or legal thought) can actually affect our material conditions. We can accommodate our theory to our practice and vice versa. Put simply, human reflective thought has definite efficacy; it is not just an epiphenomenon of the material conditions of life. This form of looser materialism can be observed in some of Marx's 379  © Basil Blackwell Ltd. HeinOnline — 20 J.L. & Soc'y 379 1993 writings and in the subsequent Marxis t tradition in writers like Antonio Gramsci, Georg Lukfcs, and Karl Korsch. 29 Such a looser materialism is also more aware of the contestable nature of economic and social categories. The particular form of Marx's materialism is premised on political economy. The basic components of the doctrine can be stated as follows: human beings must subsist in order to survive and in so doing they labour. In labouring, humans use certain material technologies (crudely) or modes of production.In working within a mode of production, whether in a medieval rural context with a plough or within a nineteenth century factory with a machine, humans come into relations of production, that is, relations with other human beings within the productive process. Relations of production crystallize into groups called classes whose relations are determined by the particular form or mode of production. As forces of production change, so do relations of production. 3†³ In capitalism, for example, there are two fundamental classes. Proletarian workers sell their labour for a wage. Workers produce more than receive.The wage only provides subsistence. The capitalist class sells the products of the workers to gain profit. Capitalism thus subsists by extracting labour value from its workforce. The interests of the capitalist class necessarily conflict with those of the proletariat. Thus, material conditions of economic life form the real basis to social existence. Political and legal structures can only be understood via these material conditions. Marx, in one of his more synoptic semi-autobiographical pieces of writing, Preface to the Critique of Political Economy, called this whole 31 process the ‘leading thread' of his studies.It is worth remarking at this point that Marx's views on this ‘leading thread' have given rise to another debate which parallels the stricter and looser senses of materialism. There are interactive and passive notions of economic reductionism. On the passive view (which corresponds to stricter materialism), law and the state emerge instrumentally from economic forces. They have no independent efficacy or reality. The state and law are not understood to arise from conscious human intention; rather, they reflect the 32 class struggle that takes place in the context of the economic base of society.Many Marxists writers find themselves uniformly uneasy with this form of passive reductionism. 3 3 In this more sceptical reading, Marx's Preface (mentioned above), as well as many works by Engels, are not regarded as adequate representations of the totality of Marx's views. Antonio Gramsci, for example, regularly dismissed this more passive view in the curt phrase ‘economism'. For such critics, passive reductionism contains an impoverished and simplistic conception of the state and law. It does not grasp the more interactive quality of the state and legal system, and it ignores the conflicts between classes over authority within st ate.Neither does it explain how the economic base actually ‘determines' law. The actual causal mechanism remains inchoate in Marx's writings. Marx's texts, it is argued, are rife with potential for more interactive readings. However, the Marx of the Preface could reply to this criticism by arguing that such a view is in imminent danger of ‘legal fetishism', where law is seen as both necessary for 380 D Basil Blackwell Ltd. HeinOnline — 20 J. L. & Soc'y 380 1993 the existence of society and autonomous from economic or class factors. There is nothing unique about law in the passive reductionist reading.However, most exponents of interactionism would not want to argue that law has total autonomy; rather, that the law can, in certain circumstances, act upon economic life and can either facilitate or work against a particular mode of production. The ambiguities over these various positions can be observed in Marx's classic account of the transition from feudalism to ca pitalism. As commercial capitalism slowly develops at the economic base it, of necessity, erodes feudal relations. It is no use to capitalists that a workforce is tied by feudal bonds to a particular aristocratic landowner or piece of ancient property.In addition, communal land (or wood), which all can freely utilize as a common resource, is also deeply inconvenient for capitalism. Property, for capitalists (as in Marx's observations in the wood theft article), must be privately owned and tradable. Labour must also be free of feudal ties in order to travel where the work is needed by capitalists. These processes were obviously facilitated by coercion and outright violence, as in many cases of enclosure; however, as Marx noted, law also expedited the whole process in developing sophisticated systems of property law, contract law, and tort.In creating a landless poor (‘free labour') and a contractual private property-based law, the groundwork for capitalism was gradually laid. T he problem is how to read these events. On the one hand, law could be seen (as in the interactive thesis) as semi-autonomous, providing intentionally the conditions for changes in the mode of production. In fact, it is arguable that law consciously constituted the integuments of a mode of production. This argument throws doubt on the unidirectional determinism and passivity thesis.On the other hand, law can be read as a coercive structure representing the actual dominance of the bourgeoisie of the means of production, but determined by the laws of the economic base. In this latter reading, law has no autonomy whatsoever. It simply and instrumentally reflects the economic base. Support for both lines of argument can found in Marx. BASE, SUPERSTRUCTURE, AND LEGAL IDEOLOGY The basic idea of base and superstructure follows neatly from the previous section. In fact, once again, we find similar disputes being echoed from previous sections.One theory sees a precise causal relationship. The other theory sees a looser tendency and more interactive quality in base and superstructure. This latter theory leads some critics to bewail even the use of terms like ‘base' and ‘superstructure'. It is argued that it would be far better if we treated these terms as more or less useful metaphors, not referring to any empirical reality. 34 As in many of Marx's writings, half the problem here might simply be because Marx never really addressed the problem head on. 5 The terms occur in certain writings, but Marx did not appear to have any inkling of how much significance was going to be placed on them by 381  © Basil Blackwell Ltd. HeinOnline — 20 J. L. & Soc'y 381 1993 subsequent generations. The older instrumental causal account of base and superstructure sees a clear correspondence between laws and political institutions (superstructure) and the economic base. As Marx put it unequivocally in his Preface to a Critique of PoliticalEconomy: With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed.In considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict†¦ Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so we can not judge such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life. For example, laws on land tenure in the feudal period (a superstructural phenomenon) changed markedly with the development of capitalism. The real foundation for these changes and the explanation of them would be sought in the actual change in the modes and relations of productio n – the material base. There are a number of minor problems with the above view. First, it is not easy to see how the above thesis explains why certain types of law occur. For example, how, on the above model, would one explain factory legislation, which controlled the activities of capitalists?Alternatively, what of social welfare legislation or legislation which enacts progressive redistributive taxation? Admittedly, it could be replied here that such laws indirectly help capitalism by improving the condition of the working class and preventing revolution, while paying a minimum cost. Thus, despite appearances, such legislation aids capitalism: it is in essence still a business proposition. This counter argument might hold for some legislation, but what of other laws which prevent abuse to children, punish rape, or ensure the proper care of the mentally handicapped?What of laws which define the roles of an official in local or central government or, alternatively, traffic l aw? Surely it is not as easy to explain these as clearly causally related to the economic base of capitalism. Any attempt to do so would surely look very far-fetched. In other words, the instrumental thesis does not account for the totality of law. Secondly, certain legal rules appear to be part of the relations of production, for example, contract law. The relations of production are held together by such contractual rules. They form a kind of social glue for such economic practices.The question arises, therefore, can we separate out contractual law and the relations of production? If the relations of production are constituted by legal vocabulary then there can be no clear determination of the superstructure by the base. Thus, for these, and many other reasons, a number of commentators have felt distinctly uneasy with the instrumental/ causal base superstructure model. 3 7 In fact, Marx did not use the model with any great frequency and late in life Engels also wrote a number of o ft-quoted 3s qualifying letters which appear to give a lot of ground to sceptics.As noted above, in the quotation from Marx's Preface, Marx often tended 382 (C Basil Blackwell Ltd. HeinOnline — 20 J. L. & Soc'y 382 1993 to view ideology from a similar causal perspective. One way of viewing an important dimension of the superstructure is as the body of ideas of a society. Marx refers, in the above quotation, to the legal, political, religious, aesthetic, and philosophical ideas of a society. The quotation clearly takes a ‘reductionist' and ‘instrumental' view of ideology. Ideas are explained via their connection to the material base.Legal ideology is thus, once again, part of the consciousness of bourgeois society, and, as Marx clearly observed: ‘Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so we can not judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness'. Thus, overt legal ideas and forms tells us virtually n othing substantive – they merely reflect deeper economic changes. 39 It is understandable in this reductionist reading that Engels and others should thus have referred to ideology as the ‘false-consciousness' of a class like the bourgeoisie.Lawyers might thus be regarded as professional ideologists or ‘waged hacks' (in fact like most intellectuals, professional groups, and academics) for the bourgeoisie. Subsequently Marx's ideas came under certain pressures and a number of questions arose 0 In his early writings Marx appeared to be contrasting ‘ideology' with ‘reality as practice' – a form of philosophical materialist ontology. Liberal capitalism was in an equivalent position to religion as a distortion of the human essence. Later this contrast became ideology (as distortion) as against natural science (as truth or knowledge).The change in perspective here refers, once again, to the idea of an epistemological break in Marx's writings. However, in both these views, it remained unclear as to what to include within the term ideology. In some writings it appeared to be widely inclusive – consciousness in general. In other writings he appeared to limit himself to economic and political ideas. The question arose at the time (which is still unresolved) as to whether natural science was part of ideology or was wholly distinct. Marx also did not explain, as mentioned earlier, the precise mechanisms of determinism.For example, it is not clear (taking A as the economic base and B as legal ideology), whether ‘determine' means that A causes B, tends to affect B, or sets parameters to B, or alternatively, whether there is a symbiotic relation of A to B. 41 In strictly practical terms, such corrosive ambiguities do link up to quite ordinary questions on legal activity. As Hugh Collins observes: ‘The question is whether a judge follows instrumental considerations with a class character or operates a discrete 42 mode of reasoning'. Marxists have gone on struggling with the concept of ideology.Some, like Gramsci, found inspiration in ideas of ‘relative autonomy', which allows some leeway for ‘a discrete mode of legal reasoning'. In Gramsci's thesis (which for some is present in Marx's writings like the 18th Brumaire), domination under capitalism is not simply achieved by coercion, but, subtly, through the hegemony of ideas. The ideology of the ruling class becomes vulgarized into the common sense of the average citizen. Power is not just crude legal force, but, conversely, domination of language, morality, and culture. Laws, for example, become internalized within the consciousness of 383  © Basil Blackwell Ltd.HeinOnline — 20 J. L. & Soc'y 383 1993 each citizen. The masses are quelled and co-opted by this internalization of ideas. The hegemonic ideas become the actual experiences of the subordinate classes. Bourgeois hegemony moulds the personal convictions, norms, and aspirat ions of the proletariat. Gramsci thus called for a struggle at the level of ideology. Organic intellectuals situated within the proletariat should combat this by developing a counter-hegemony to traditional intellectuals upholding bourgeois hegemony – which might be considered as the basis of a credo for critical legal studies.In sum, this perspective does not consider law as just instrumental. Law does not necessarily uphold the interests of the ruling class and it is not simply determined by the economic base; in fact, it may have some counter-determining role on the base itself. These themes will be pursued more intently in the final section. LAW, POLITICS, AND STATE One view of the state and law, which predominates in Marx's writings, is that they are a condensation of the economic interests of the dominant class.The state is thus viewed as the ‘executive committee to manage the affairs of the bourgeoisie'. The state acts as its oppressive agent in civil society, su ppressing proletarian interests in favour of capital accumulation. The personnel of the state owe allegiance to one particular class – the bourgeoisie. Lawyers would be viewed as waged lackeys of the bourgeoisie. Law is part of this oppressive mechanism and embodies the ideological mystifications of bourgeois intellectualism. The bourgeois capitalist class dominates political power hrough its domination of economic power. This is the more traditional view of the state, epitomized in The Communist Manifesto. As Marx stated unequivocally in the latter work: Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your bourgeois production and bourgeois property, just as your jurisprudence is but the will of your class made into law for all, a will whose essential character and direction are determined by the 43 economical conditions of existence of your class. The above argument is a form of class reductionism.The bourgeois state and legal system are class-based phenomena. Cl ass, for Marx, refers to large social groups linked together in certain social relations within a mode of production. Each class receives differential rewards, power, and status. Relations between classes tend to be conflictual. Within the instrumental perspective, the state and legal system are seen to condense the interests of one class. The state is not a representation of any collective good or impartiality. It is, rather, integral to certain specific economic interests in society.Class interests are seen to manage the state apparatus in the interests of that class – the bourgeoisie in capitalist society. The history of states is therefore subsumable under class interest. Marx tended, in many writings, to interpret nineteenth-century legislation, particularly in Britain, in such class terms. For example, the passing of the Reform Bill and Ten-Hours Bill, and 384 (D Basil Blackwell Ltd. HeinOnline — 20 J. L. & Soc'y 384 1993 the repeal of the Corn Laws, were seen as aspects of the economic conflict between the bourgeoisie and landed aristocracy.The above view reflects dolefully on a number of issues. First, there does not appear to be any difference between a democratic rule-of-law constitutional state (Rechtsstaat) and an unconstitutional, undemocratic despotism. Both are simply exploitative class-based entities. † The former state simply shields its basic exploitative character more successfully, particularly under guises like the ‘rule of law'. Secondly, both the ‘general' rule-of-law principle and ‘particular' property, contract or criminal laws, are simply there to buttress the property owners of capitalism.The rule of law is a typical example of legal fetishism, namely, giving law a false autonomy from the economic and class base of society. In times of high productivity, the constitutional capitalist state will give the appearance of some concern, via state spending, but it will show its true colours during perio ds of economic crisis. The first cuts will always be to the welfare of working people. The rule of law is thus an elaborate confidence trick. 45 Thirdly, Marx suggests that the so-called equal rights of liberal states have grossly unequal effects.The rights 4 of human beings are in reality the rights of bourgeois men in civil society. 1 They protect individual capitalists in their exploitative practices and they protect the unequal economic results of such practices. Rights are associated with individuals who ‘own' them in order to protect private interests. Rights thus shield the basic inequalities and exploitative practices of bourgeois culture. Bourgeois culture ignores material inequalities and slavishly adheres to formal legal, moral or political equality of rights.Marx found this whole scenario profoundly objectionable. Equally, from the same perspective, the justice that we observe in liberal societies is another aspect of the ideology of capitalism. It concentrates min imally on how goods might be distributed (if it gets as far as distributive justice) and ignores the massive inequalities implicit in the production process itself. In other words, it shuts the stable door after the capitalist horse has bolted. Justice is not a virtue for communists. Marx thus quite explicitly takes an anti-justice and anti-rights stance.With genuine communism, there would be no classes, no coercion, no conflict, and no private ownership; in consequence, there would be no need for justice or right claims. If there is abundance and communal ownership, then there is no reason for principles of allocation or any allocating or adjudication mechanisms. In sum, Marx objects, in this reading, to the whole notion of the juridical legal state as a complex sham. As law is integral to the idea of the state in Marx, so the antistatist stance of communism implies the abolition of law.The traditional account above is not without some internal ambiguity, particularly over notions like ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat'. This latter doctrine envisages the state as not so much a negative, coercive, backwardlooking institution, as rather an instrument of positive revolutionary change utilized for the benefit, ultimately, of humanity (even if it is still viewed as a transitional entity). Marx's own qualified fervour for the state can be observed, even in Capital,where he remarked enthusiastically on the work of 385 0 Basil Blackwell Ltd. HeinOnline — 20 J. L. Soc'y 385 1993 the Factory Inquiry Commission in Britain, specifically the work of Leonard Horner, as rendering ‘undying service to the English working class. He [Leonard Horner] carried on a life-long contest, not only with the embittered manufacturers, but also with the Cabinet'. 47 Marx later commented, with evident relish, that British manufacturers compared the factory inspectorate 4 8 with revolutionary commissioners of the French National Convention. However, this was hardly a n egative coercive vision of a class-based state functioning only in the interests of the bourgeoisie.The stricter class view of the state and law also suggests that if there were no class there would, in turn, be no law and no state. Class conflict is the prerequisite of the state. This view was later crystallized in Lenin's work, The State and Revolution. This idea, in turn, gives rise to the idea (initiated by Engels and carried on by Lenin, although many would contend it was also present in Marx) that the state and legal order will ‘wither away'. In this sense a communist society would be stateless and lawless (in a strictly descriptive sense).Thus, from the standpoint of a strict materialism, the state is not a major player. The end. result of this looks very much like communist anarchism, although Marx himself argued fiercely against such a conclusion and showed only vitriolic contempt for anarchists like Proudhon and Bakunin. However, Marx never resolved this issue of the relation between communism and mainstream anarchism. However, the class reductionist and instrumental perspective does not represent the totality of Marx's writings. Let us take the question of class first.Class, in certain works, is seen as more complex, fragmented, and containing fractions with no overt connection to political or legal domination. The state and its legal system, in this reading, clearly does not embody the interests of a ruling class. In addition there can be, as Marx demonstrated with great verve in the 18th Brumaire, intra-class conflict between fractions. Marx mentions four fractions within the bourgeoisie who often conflict: landed property, the financial aristocracy, the industrial bourgeoisie, and commercial bourgeoisie.In addition, the lumpenproletariat are kept separate from the proletariat, and the petty bourgeoisie from the peasantry. As one commentator has remarked, ‘the recourse to â€Å"fractions† of classes . . . indicates that . . . â €Å"class† is not a sufficiently precise concept to be of value in explaining particular events'. 49 Law, in this fraction perspective, can actually become a ‘site of class struggle'. 50 Laws are therefore not always oppressive in the interest of one class. In fact, many laws can benefit the working class, for example, factory legislation. Certain laws also result from pressures from multifarious groups outside social classes. In addition, the notion of class remains deeply ambiguous since Marx nowhere explains its precise relation to property ownership. The doubts over the relation between class and state, outlined in the 18th Brumaire,led Marx to suggest that in the conditions that pertained in France in the period 1848-50, the state did not represent any bourgeois fractions, or even the bourgeoisie in general. In fact, Marx contends that the state and law may work against the interests of the bourgeoisie. 52 This effectively under386  ©D Blackwell Basil Ltd. HeinOn line — 20 J. L. & Soc'y 386 1993 ined both the idea of the direct synonymity of ‘class' to ‘law' and ‘state', and also the necessity of class for analysing the state (although both these views are strongly maintained by Marx in The Communist Manifesto, amongst other writings). It is these qualifying arguments of Marx which enabled the development of what is now called ‘state autonomy theory', which has powerfully shaped late twentieth-century Marxist studies. The theory, in varying degrees, sees the state and law as a factor of cohesion, a site of struggle between fractions of classes, and an institution which may even regulate class conflict.The basic point is that legal reasoning takes on a relative autonomy from the economic base of society. It is not totally to be explained via modes or relations of production. This relative autonomy thesis might make us consider anew the curt dismissals of notions like the rule of law. Certainly a number of recent commentators have picked up on this theme in Marx, suggesting that the theory of unidirectional determinism of base and superstructure does not really work for explaining the nature of law itself.Laws are actually integral to certain types of relations of production. E. P. Thompson, following this line of thought, has spoken of law in eighteenth-century England as ‘deeply imbricated within the very basis of productive relations, which would have been inoperable without law'. He continues that we cannot ‘simply separate off all law as ideology, and assimilate this also to the state apparatus of a ruling class'. 53 Taking on board the Gramscian thesis of ideological hegemony being a sphere of struggle, Thompson contends that disputes are fought out in the sphere of law.Law certainly still expressed class power; however, part of the success of legal ideology itself was its appearance of impartiality. As Thompson notes, law ‘cannot seem to be so without its own logic and criteria of equity; indeed, on occasion, by actually being just†¦ even rulers find a need to legitimize their power, to moralize their functions, to feel themselves to be useful and just'. 54 The rhetoric was not therefore empty, even if it was still rhetoric. Semi-autonomous legal logic was thus often used against dominant groups – which was precisely a central aspect of Marx's argument in the 18th Brumaire.Thus, for Thompson, law does not equal raw class power. It was certainly involved in class power and it redefined property rights in undermining feudalism, but its focus was not exclusively on class interest. Its own logic and rhetoric gave it a partial autonomy which inhibited, in some cases, the dominant groups. It was also a site of struggle between fractions of these dominant groups. As Thompson concludes, such a notion of the rule of law is markedly different from arbitrary despotism. It is, in fact, he notes, a ‘cultural achievement'. 5 The effort to redeem Marx from his anti-statist and anti-law stance, via some notion of relative autonomy, has also had other defenders. Some critics have found in Marx's early writings a number of themes which add support this vision. For example, in one of his early writings, Marx speaks -oflaw as ‘the positive, bright and general norms in which freedom has attained to an existence that is impersonal, theoretical and independent of the arbitrariness of individuals. A people's statute book is its Bible of freedom'. 56 He also 387 Basil Blackwell Ltd. HeinOnline — 20 J. L. & Soc'y 387 1993 makes favourable noises, at points, about customary law established over 7 time, as against the new laws of the bourgeoisie. 5 Others have noted, with surprise, that Marx draws distinctions between ‘real' and ‘unreal' law. For example, on the same page of the article referred to above, Marx speaks of law becoming active: as soon as it is transgressed for it is only true law when in it t he unconscious natural law of freedom becomes the conscious law of the state. Where law is true law, i. . where it is the existence of freedom, it is the true existence of the freedom of man. Thus laws cannot prevent man's actions, for they are the inner laws of life. Paul Phillips remarks on this point that: ‘The significance of this distinction is that it posits the existence of an order superior to that of mere man-made law 58 and, to that extent, it is a Natural Law Theory'. Marx, even in his later writings, appeared to believe that there is a condition of freedom and wholeness for human beings, where their real natures will flourish.There is, as one critic has put it, a ‘myth of transparency' in Marx (as in Hegel) – this is ‘the vision of a society in which something â€Å"standing behind† the set of available social roles and relations†¦ will be revealed in a social order which will have become â€Å"obvious† to the participants'. 59 This notion of positive freedom, wholeness, and perfectibility behind the veil, is both implicit in the discussion of alienation (in the earlier writings), and restlessly present just under the surface of the later discussions of exploitation and communism.  ° This vision of freedom is subtly linked to Marx's strong (if unstated) communitarianism, namely, his deeply-rooted belief that humans are social creatures and can only develop freely within a particular type of community. This is the community which is distorted and lost in capitalism and will be recovered in communism. Humans are meant to develop historically toward such a society. Marx did not like to be associated with such a view, since it smacked of romantic utopianism. However, it is undeniably there throughout the corpus of his writings. Alienation is a prime example of such erfectibility lost and regained. The notion developed initially in a theological context. Humans were alienated from God through their sin. In H egel, the alienation is philosophical: spirit (or mind) externalizes itself in the world. It becomes alien to itself. The task of thought is to overcome the self-alienation of spirit, to perceive itself at home in the world. Overcoming alienation is realizing that the world is not alien to our thought. For Feuerbach, however, the real alienation is that human beings have placed their essence into either God or the Hegelian Spirit.To overcome alienation is to transform the subject and object – to realize that God is idealized humanity. For Marx, on the other hand, alienation takes on a number of subtle forms. 61 The basic idea is that human alienation is more immediate and practical, and subsumes all the other notions. In discussing the topic, Marx speaks initially of alienation through labour. Labour creates capital and capital escapes the control of labour and takes on a supposedly independent existence, which in turn dominates the original producer. Workers thus find they a re alienated from the product of 388 (D Basil Blackwell Ltd.HeinOnline — 20 J. L. & Soc'y 388 1993 their labour. Labour, in this capitalist context, is no longer free and creative. It is necessary for subsistence and thus exercises alien compulsion over the worker. In consequence, workers are alienated from free creativity (which is the true nature of human beings) and they are thus also alienated from their fellow human beings. Overcoming human alienation implies ultimately overthrowing the economic and social forms which generate the loss of reality and the self. The solution to the riddle of history and human alienation is communism. 2 There is strong sense here of a definite underlying human nature, with certain specifiable needs, which can flourish under a specific type of community, which recognizes certain ‘natural laws', not necessarily as overt imperatives from some external authority, but more as natural non-coercive norms derived from reason. Despite Marx's a ppearance as an anti-law theorist, some writers have claimed that it is possible to identify a communist theory of law and justice, and also, possibly, of state (given Marx's early interest in a radical democratic participatory state). 3 In certain writings, particularly The Critique of the Gotha Programme, Marx does indicate that there would be a principle of justice under communism – ‘from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs'. 64 Such a notion of justice would presumably prevent unequal access to the means of production and also prohibit alienation and exploitation. It would also respond distributivelyto human needs – although Marx leaves the concept of ‘need' fairly open. Needs for social relations, satisfying labour, and the like, move well beyond physical subsistence.It is difficult not to consider some of Marx's needs as ‘wants' or ‘interests', which are surely markedly different notions. Tom Campbell, amongst a number of recent theorists, believes that we can reconcile Marx's historicism, and aspects of a looser materialism, with a belief in communist justice and the moral superiority of such a society. He di

Digital Market Markt

Introduction Traditional Market The definition of the Traditional market is the directly meet customers. It’s based on four P's strategies. There is no intermediator and profit orientation. In traditional marketing the various media can be used for marketing products for example television, radio, print such as newspaper, magazines etc. Traditional markets can be also referred to as markets or marketplaces, is a relative to the supermarket stores, usually in a community will have at least one. There are three parties involving in the marketplace processes, which are basically the manufacturers, the marketing intermediaries and the customers.Manufacturers are the ones converting raw materials into goods and will either sell the goods directly to the customers or the marketing intermediaries whereas marketing intermediaries such as physical distribution firms, resellers, financial intermediaries and marketing services agencies will help the company to promote, sell and distribut e the products to the final buyers. In traditional markets, customers will be able to see, touch and feel the goods and also have a face-to-face contact with the marketers. Also, customers can make a payment by paying cash, using debit card or credit card. Digital MarketThe definition of the Digital market is an electronic market that the use of information and communications technology to present a range of offerings available in a market segment so that the purchaser can compare the prices (and other attributes) of the offerings and make a purchase decision. Digital market is a broad term that refers to various and different promotional techniques deployed to reach customers via digital technologies. Digital market is embodied by an extensive selection of service, product and brand marketing tactics, which mainly use Internet as a core promotional medium, in addition to mobile and traditional TV and radio.In regard to internet marketing, these strategies could include videos, blog s, social networks, banners, online classified, online business listings, affiliate programs, ; articles, internet radio shows, and other options. Digital market involves promoting a product or service through the internet, mobile applications or email campaigns. Digital market is also known as Internet marketing, but their actual processes differ, as digital market is considered more targeted, measurable, and interactive. CONTENT OF TRADITIONAL MARKET Difference between Digital Market and Traditional MarketCompanies locate those products online that are usually bought by the customers. They located most wanted products and design with better qualities. Digital marketing helps customers to integrate the customer’s traffic across different types of marketing channels. It helps to open new and latest leas sources that are producing new models for variety of services. It also helps to give practical perspectives to involve the customers are exact decision making process. You can also develop and implement a wide variety of several models of growth.Digital marketing helps to design accurate models of business and track the ways of development in order to introduce with different opportunities through customer oriented approach or technique. When companies decide to expand their networks across cities or countries, they need to study all traditions and buying habits of customers belonging to that location. After study all traditions or buying habits, they need to design their products. When they design their products, they need to use digital marketing to create awareness about their products or services.Digital marketing helps them to promote their products. Digital marketing is a group of connected devices through internet that always busy to grab the attention of consumers efficiently. Digital marketing has huge innovative techniques or strategies that help companies to expand their products or services. They can make a direct contact with their customers or send messages that motivate customers about their products. Marketing content or messages sent by companies are engage to attract the customers and motivate them about product’s description.When companies launch their products in new place, they need to analyzed and organized clients mix of various channels with cost effective offerings. They need to redesign their content production procedures. Clients can easily find their required products. You should be careful about the social habits of customers when you launch your products. Companies locate those products online that are usually bought by the customers. Companies use different types of organized database that helps them to locate most buying products. They located most wanted products and design with better qualities.In digital marketing, you can use different marketing or social media to launch your products or services. There are many service providers in the markets that help you to find best digital marketing in order to analyze the resources and requirements of small as well as large business organizations. You can use social marketing, email, mobile or different channels to promote your products. It helps to find reliable and comfortable solutions of various issues. Marketers do not use traditional marketing because it is not convenient to grab the attention of customers.Digital marketing is a part of traditional marketing but more innovative that always uses multi channels in order to promote the products or services. Traditional markets are using the ‘reactive strategic posture toward cybermarketing’ to selling their product to their consumers. Reactive strategic posture toward cybermarketing means that the company is focus on their physical distribution such as shop or outlets even though the company has opened online distribution channel. Traditional styles and theirs activities are unchanged and always be mentioned.However, it is not many of companies using this way. Some of them are only focus on their physical distribution and they are not going to open a business at internet. Instance of company only selling their product through their physical distribution is Nadeja cake shop. They are only doing their business using their own physical distribution. Traditional markets are using the regional marketing to advertise their product into their target market. They are focus on smaller size of the customers and try to satisfy their need and want.Besides, they are using their physical distribution to sell their product to their customers. Hence, it is subject to limit the sources of the consumers, and smaller the market share of the product. And they need to distribute many outlets to make their product more convenient for their target customers and increase their profit. When traditional market is used Business transactions only take place at a fixed time, which is normally from 9a. m. to 5p. m. (Monday to Friday), which is the local time. One can only visit the outlets at that particular time in order to purchase the company’s product.When buyers have specific needs, they will go to traditional market to look for their needs. Buyers determine the product offering and sellers determine the customer needs. Besides that, seller also offering goods that may fulfill those buyer needs. Therefore, traditional markets exist. Why traditional market is used Traditional market is used because can build long term relationship with seller or buyer and built on face-to-face interaction so that seller can learn more about potential buyers. , marketers are able to gain more trust aspect from the customers.A lot of people feel more comfortable purchasing products by visiting the physical stores as they are able to have a face-to-face-communication and eye contact with the consumers. Also, customers are able to feel, touch and see the goods before they make a purchase. Secondly, it has a higher durability. Advertising through online me dium carries lots of uncertainties as the company’s website can be deleted, moved anytime and the search engine results change quite often. However, advertising through offline medium last longer as posters, billboards, flyers, banners and more bear longer than those ads on the internet.Thirdly, marketers will be able to get a faster results and response from the customers. If the advertisements are placed at the right place and the messages are address to the right customer, there will be lots of responses from the customers. However for digital markets, it takes time for any real results to happen as a market’s website will not be able to get high ranking from search engine optimization for a day or a month. It might even take up to several years to get responses from the customers. How traditional market is used Traditional markets are using the regional marketing to advertise their product into their target market.They are focus on smaller size of the customers and try to satisfy their need and want. Besides, they are using their physical distribution to sell their product to their customers. Hence, it is subject to limit the sources of the consumers, and smaller the market share of the product. And they need to distribute many outlets to make their product more convenient for their target customers and increase their profit. Traditional markets are using the reactive strategic posture toward cyber marketing to selling their product to their consumers. Reactive strategic posture toward cyber marketing means that the company is focus on heir physical distribution such as shop or outlets even though the company has opened online distribution channel. Besides, traditional markets are using personal selling marketing strategy to promote their product to their customers. They are promoting face to face, persuade consumer to purchase. When digital market is used Digital market is the use of information and communications technology to present a ran ge of offerings available in a market segment so that the purchaser can compare the prices (and other attributes) of the offerings and make a purchase decision.Physical location of a market is in many cases irrelevant to buyers and sellers. Thus, digital market exists. Why digital market is used . This is because to improve economic efficiency by reducing margins between price and costs and speeding up complicated business deals. It may have high possibility to gather more customer information. Firstly, business transactions can be performed anytime and not limited to the fixed time restrictions, such as from 9a. m. to 5p. m. (Monday to Friday). Customers are allowed to purchase a product according to their time zone.For example, Amazon. com allows everyone to purchase their products without restrictions of time, which is for 365 days and 24 hours. Secondly, it helps to create a bounder less world as goods can be globally reached. For instance, an online database of properties in Gr eenland can be accessed not only from Greenland and also anywhere else such as Malaysia, Taiwan, America, Australia and more through the internet. Thirdly, marketers are able to deliver rich messages which contain texts, audios, videos, images and animationssimultaneously to a substantial amount of customers.For instance, Air Asia. com is able to persuadelarge amount of customers to purchase their passenger tickets as they are able to deliver their promotional activities, advertisements and price offer creatively and effectively to the customers. Fourthly, there is a two way communication between the marketers and customers. How digital market is used The exchange of goods and services between the marketers and customers take place through the electronic devices such as internet, ipad, iphone, laptop, phones and more.Digital markets are unconstrained by the shelf space, thus marketers are able to list out a catalogs of what the company is selling, the price they offer, promotions an d more on their own website. Advantages of Traditional Marketing Faster Results Many forms of internet marketing, such as search engine optimization and banner ads, can take several weeks before any real results start to happen. Furthermore, banner ads are reportedly becoming less effective now-a-days and can also take some time to produce sufficient outcome.Traditional marketing however, can produce much faster and more effective results with well-placed ads that are suitable to a particular audience. You can expect a stronger impact in lesser time with traditional marketing. Durability The truth is many websites are deleted, moved, or abandoned all the time and search engine results also change periodically. Advertising offline has no uncertainties in that nature in any way. You can give someone your business card and that same reference can be good 10 or 20 years later.The same bears true for flyers and posters, although handouts have a slightly lower life expectancy than busines s cards. The point is that a business is more durable offline than it is online. Trust Trust is a huge factor of any business, regardless of how it is promoted. Many people are more comfortable with buying products from offline ads than on the internet. The reason is that you get to see the people or company you are interested in buying from and get to know them a little before you actually purchase. More times than not, many online ads and websites don't provide that same trust aspect.The lingering of endless scam sites over the internet just makes that problem even worse. So most certainly, trust is more established in traditional marketing than on the internet. Disadvantages of Traditional market Timing Traditional marketing uses static text or advertising commercials to promote a product. If an ad is placed in the newspaper, it can't change until you place another advertise. For example, if you have a sale on bicycles that you put in the newspaper and then you run out of bicycle s, you may have many unhappy customers.On the other hand, on the Internet you can instantly update your page to let people know your bicycles are â€Å"sold out. † Costs Customer must pay for advertise in newspapers or mailers every time you run a new campaign. Adding new products or sales pages to your website doesn't create additional costs if you already have a person on your team who can update your product information. Traditional marketing companies may charge per delivery area for fliers or mailers. On the Internet, your advertise is accessible to the entire World Wide Web. CustomizationWith traditional market, it is difficult to target a specific customer. Specific market segments can be targeted, but not an individual. For example, advertising may target young women. The advertising may show young people interacting and present interesting copy about a new style of purse. On the Internet, new marketing techniques can track what a viewer has looked at and suggest simi lar products. Pricing Options Traditional marketing can present special sales and pricing. However, it is typically more difficult to offer complex bundle pricing.Most print marketing doesn't have the space to explain all the different pricing variations that may appeal to buyers. An online catalogue may present you with an offer that if customers buy four items from one category, you get a free item from another category. Advantages of Digital Marketing Sending communications to a large number of people, really quickly Theoretically, we assume that some people who see your campaign message are so impressed that they quickly forward it to their friends. These friends also like your message, and send it off to their list of contacts.For example, if you send a message to 20 people, and each person shares the same with 100 others, who share it with 100 more, your internet marketing message has potentially been viewed by 200,000 people. This can be the whole population of a small town. Cost YouTube videos, Facebook posts or Twitter tweets can be created at almost zero cost. This allows you to connect with millions of Internet users, practically for free. Does not require much work Once you create your message, whether a video, photo, post or tweet, you just need to send it out once.If your digital marketing message is good enough, it will spread like wildfire, bringing you a whole host of new customers. Has a long shelf life All messages that you send over the Internet can be viewed by people for years. Sure, there will be times when your message will be more in vogue than others. People sometimes check their email or Facebook accounts after months. Those who find your internet marketing message appealing may forward it to their friends at a later date, giving you a pleasant surprise in the future.As internet marketing messages spread far and wide, it is quite possible for you to reap rich harvests at a later date. Disadvantage of Digital Market Lack of security I nformation of trading could be taped and fallen into the hands of criminals. The security used for payment might not be able to protect the users privacy. Rapid Change The software development tools are still evolving and changing rapidly. Not all digital market users can adapt to these changes. Lack of trust and user resistance Buyers do not trust an unknown faceless seller, paperless transactions, and electronic money.Lack of product contact Lack of touch and feel online. Some buyers like to touch items. Conclusion In conclusion, digital market same important with traditional market and each market have its benefits to society, but also companies. Users can access to digital market from anywhere via network connection, the physical location of digital market is not important to sellers and buyers. Besides, digital market has uniform way of searching and providing information of products and services. Traditional market is more complicated to search product.For my opinion, I had st udy how important is the two markers toward the company. The digital markets and traditional markets are very important to the companies. This is because, it can help the companies selling their products to their final customers to achieve their company goals. Although both markets have difference, they are helping the companies selling their product to their target markets and gain user. By using these two ways effectively, they can bring the company to the greater height and gaining more profit.